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Mining Gold in a Conflict Zone: The Context,
Ramifications, and Lessons of AngloGold
Ashanti’s Activities in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Brandon Prosansky*
“We mine gold. We sell gold. That’s what we do.”1 - Steve Lenahan,
Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, AngloGold Ashanti
“We are cursed because of our gold. All we do is suffer. There is no
benefit to us.”2 - Congolese gold miner
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

In 2003, AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), a gold- mining company based in South
Africa, started to lay the groundwork under which it would be able to commence goldmining exploration activities in Mongbwalu, a city in the northeastern Ituri District of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At the same time, the Nationa list and
Integrationist Front (FNI), an armed faction vying for power in the Ituri area, was
engaged in a campaign of grave human rights abuses against the local Congolese
population. Inevitably, the paths of these two organizations crossed. AngloGold Ashanti
claims that any contacts with the FNI were unavoidable. The FNI claims that AGA could
not do business in Ituri without working with the FNI. To some extent, AGA may be
involved in human rights abuses through its link with the FNI.
AngloGold Ashanti posted $2.629 billion of gold income in 2005. 3 The DRC’s
2005 GDP was seven billion dollars. 4 To say that AGA is a powerful entity amid the
African continent is an understatement, and AGA certainly influences the enjoyment of
* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; B.S. in Business, summa cum laude in
Finance, A.B., summa cum laude in Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, Miami University, 2001. I would like
to thank Professor Stephen Sawyer and Annie Wallis for their valuable and insightful advice and
comments. I would also like to thank my consistently supportive family and friends, and Sarah Schwartz
and her family for their continued interest in this topic.
1
Interview with Steve Lenahan, Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, AngloGold Ashanti, in
Johannesburg, South Africa (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Steve Lenahan] (discussing
AngloGold Ashanti’s activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
2
Hum. Rts. Watch, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1 (2005) (written by Anneke
Van Woudenberg). All subsequent citations to this report refer to the text version of the report, with no
pictures, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/drc0505text.pdf.
3
A NGLOGOLD A SHANTI, 2005 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2006) available at
http://www.anglogold.com/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/AnnualReport05/report/pdf/Summary_report
_2005.pdf.
4
David McKay, DRC Miners in for “Peace Rerating”, MININGMX.COM, Feb. 11, 2006,
http://www.miningmx.com/events/zambia2006/893782.htm.
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internationally recognized human rights by many on the African continent through its
gold mining and exploration activities, from providing employment to improving
infrastructure. 5 AGA justifies its decision to operate in the DRC by claiming that its
operations will provide econo mic growth to help transform the country. 6 The company
claims it consulted extensively with the DRC government and the United Nations (UN)
before deciding to operate in Ituri, but that conditions suddenly became non-conducive to
normal business. 7 Companies should not be punished for lawfully investing in “bad”
countries or with “bad” people, nor should they have to guess which countries are “so bad
as to warrant complete disengagement.”8 Further, international law has historically failed
to “articulate the human rights obligations of corporations and to provide mechanisms for
regulating corporate conduct in the field of human rights.”9 At the same time, the field of
corporate complicity law is emerging, and moral questions may be as important as legal
questions. 10 The international community continues to debate whether businesses should
operate in conflict zones. 11 Companies in the extractive industries may be in a
particularly unique situation, since, at least in the preliminary analysis, geography, rather
than strategic company decisions, dictate the location of their operating sites. 12 However,
on a deeper level of analysis, companies may choose not to operate in conflict zones.
AGA’s activities in the DRC, which seek to profit in a conflict zone marked by grave
human rights abuses, are thus suspect; whether those activities violate international law
or international obligations is a more complex question.
AngloGold Ashanti’s potential involvement in human rights abuses fits into the
larger context of the link between natural resource exploitation and continuing conflict
that results in human rights abuses, especially in Africa. Several interested parties,
including the Congolese government, 13 the UN, 14 and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), 15 have attempted to address these issues and inform the public. The Berlin
5

See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUM. RTS. LITIGATION 1 (2004).
Brendan Ryan, AngloGold Pays Price of First Mover Advantage, MININGMX.COM, June 1, 2005,
http://www.miningmx.com/commentary/445678.htm.
7
Id.
8
JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 52-53.
9
Ronen Schamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 635, 637 (2004) (quoting Corporate Liability for
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030 (2001)).
10
Irene Khan, Sec’y-Gen., Amnesty Int’l., Understanding Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion
Beyond Existing Laws, Address at the Business Human Rights Seminar, Dec. 8, 2005, AI Index
POL/34/001/2006, Mar. 21, 2006.
11
World Bank Inst. & U. Mich. Bus. Sch., E-Conference on Business, Peace, and Democracy, 7 (Oct. 7 Nov. 1, 2002) (edited by Djordjija Petkoski and Timothy L. Fort), available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/57522/bdp_econference.pdf.
12
Id.
13
See REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO A SSEMBLEE NATIONALE COMMISSION SPECIALE CHARGEE
DE L'EXAMEN DE LA VALIDITE DES CONVENTIONS A CARACTERE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIER CONCLUES
PENDANT LES GUERRES DE 1996-1997 ET DE 1998, RAPPORT DES TRAVEUX (2005), available at
http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/regierung/rapport_lutundula.pdf [hereinafter RAPPORT DE
L’A SSEMBLEE NATIONALE].
14
See Reports of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2001/357 (April 12, 2001), U.N.
Doc. S/2002/565 (May 22, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (October 16, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027
(October 23, 2003).
15
See Fatal Transactions, DRC’s Natural Treasures: Source of Conflict or Key to Development (2005)
(written by Saskia Van Hoyweghen), available at http://www.fataltransactions.org/DRC6
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Declaration 2005, promulgated by civil society organizations from several countries,
including Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States (US), to stop irresponsible
gold mining, calls on “governments and mining companies to respect human rights and to
stop ongoing human rights violations” through various means, such as taking legal action
under criminal law and ensuring adequate compensation of the victims of human rights
violations. 16 Additionally, other concerned NGOs have staged campaigns against the use
of “dirty gold,” primarily since eighty percent of the world’s mined gold is used in
jewelry as a high end luxury item. 17 For example, Earthworks and Oxfam have jointly
campaigned against dirty gold via the website, www.nodirtygold.org. 18 The No Dirty
Gold Campaign supports the rights of local communities “to determine their own futures
- not to have it [sic] decided for them by corporations.”19
Whatever the status of the relationship between AngloGold Ashanti and the FNI,
one unanswered question is whether the international community can hold AGA
accountable if the company was involved in human rights violations related to gold
mining in the Ituri District of the DRC. This paper will examine the various theories
upon which liability might potentially rest to hold a company accountable for suspect acts
within a conflict zone. Part I provides details concerning the link between political
developments in the DRC, gold- mining in the northeast region, and human rights abuses.
Part II documents the activities of AngloGold Ashanti in the Ituri District of the DRC and
presents the company’s record of corporate social responsibility. Part III explains
relevant international and industry norms related to corporate responsibility and
accountability for human rights violations, and analyzes whether AngloGold Ashanti’s
activities in the Ituri District comply with these norms. Part IV considers the availability
of legal remedies, including criminal prosecution and civil approaches. Part V suggests
alternative approaches to addressing the issue of corporate involvement in human rights
abuses.
II. GOLD MINING, WAR, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE ITURI DISTRICT OF THE
DRC
A. Brief History of Gold Mining in the Ituri Area

¶5

Prospectors first discovered gold in the northeastern Congo in 1903. 20 At that time
the area belonged to Belgian King Leopold II as his personal possession, and the country
was known as the Congo Free State. 21 During the first half of the twentieth century,
conference/DRC_Conference_report_FINAL_english.pdf.
16
Berlin Declaration 2005 – Stop Irresponsible Gold Mining,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2005/0918berlin.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
17
Jane Perlez & Kirk Johnson, Behind Gold’s Glitter: Torn Lands and Pointed Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2005.
18
See No Dirty Gold Campaign Home Page, http://www.nodirtygold.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Apr.
13, 2007).
19
Id.
20
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 13.
21
U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Afr. Affairs, Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jan.
2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. However, the people of the Congo Free State were
anything but free. “While [King] Leopold [II of Beligum] grandly issued edicts banning the slave trade,
virtually no visitors . . . stated the obvious; not only the porters but even the soldiers of the Force Publique
were, in effect, slaves.” A DAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD ’S GHOST , 129 (1998).
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colonial entrepreneurs exploited gold through private companies that introduced largescale or industrial mining. 22
The Congo’s independence in 1960 brought with it the nationalization of mining
companies. 23 The new Congo leadership renamed the country the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). 24 The new parliament elected Patrice Lumumba as prime minister
in the first year of independence. 25 However, his leadership did not last long. In 1965,
Lt. General Joseph Mobutu, commander in chief of the national army, seized and
centralized power. 26 The next year, the state granted the gold mining concession in the
Ituri District of the Orientale Province to the new state-owned Office of the Gold Mines
of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO). 27 This concession is one of the largest unexplored gold reserves
in Africa. 28
Mobutu centralized power during the 1970s, and in a campaign of cultural
awareness, changed the country’s name to the Republic of Zaire. 29 Mobutu enforced a
system of one-party rule during the 1980s. The early 1990s saw increased international
criticism of the Mobutu regime’s human rights practices. 30 During the early 1990s,
OKIMO granted licenses to both multinational corporations (MNCs) using industrial
methods and to local miners using artisanal methods. 31 Generally, artisanal mining in the
DRC is characterized as very labor intensive mining in dangerous and unhealthy
conditions. 32 Much of the small-scale mining is “done by hand, with broken shovels,
plastic buckets and homemade hammers.”33
B. Wars in the Congo

¶8

In October 1996, fighting broke out in what has become known as the First Congo
War. Laurent Kabila, head of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
the Congo (AFDL), in cooperation with Rwandan and Ugandan forces, invaded Zaire and
ousted Mobutu. 35 In May 1997, Kabila declared himself president of the country that he
renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He retained his support from
Rwanda. 36 However, that relationship lasted only briefly.
34

22

Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 13.
Id.
24
U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 13.
28
Id. at 14.
29
U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21. The name “Zaire” derives from a Portuguese corruption of the word
Nzere, the name for the Congo River in the languages spoken along its banks, translating as “the river that
swallows all rivers.” HOCHSCHILD, supra note 21, at 54 n.54.
30
U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
31
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 14.
32
Fatal Transactions, supra note 15, at 5.
33
Edmund Sanders, Where Others Mined Wealth, Congo Villagers Scrape Living, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2005 (“At the bottom of the deep pit are gray dolerite rocks containing tiny flecks of gold. Broken rocks
are tossed up the same line of men and carried to a tent, where another row of workers pulverizes the stones
by striking them with steel poles. To pass the time and make the work less monotonous, the laborers pound
and sing in a rhythm that can be heard a mile away”).
34
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
35
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
36
U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
23
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In July 1998, Kabila attempted to oust his Rwandan backers in what has become
known as the Second Congo War. 37 On August 2, 1998, Rwandan and Ugandan forces
entered the DRC. Kabila’s government gained the support of neighboring Angolan,
Zimbabwean, and Namibian forces, which fended off the Rwandan/Ugandan front.
Eventually, the Rwandan forces retreated but gained de facto control over parts of the
eastern DRC with the rebel group Congolese Rally for Democracy (RDC). In a similar
move Ugandan forces backed the rebel group Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) to
gain control of the northern third of the DRC. 38 These wars resulted in the deaths of 3.5
million people, many from exposure, hunger, or lack of medical assistance. 39
C. Attempts at Peace

¶10

In August 1999, all parties taking part in the conflict in the DRC signed the Lusaka
Accord. 40 This first attempt at a peace settlement involved several components,
including: a cease-fire; the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation called the UN
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC); the withdrawal of foreign troops; and an
Inter-Congolese dialogue with the goal of forming a transitional government. 41 The
parties failed to fully implement these provisions.
¶11
On January 16, 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son, Joseph Kabila,
replaced him as president. 42 From 2002-03, the foreign troops were removed from the
DRC. On December 17, 2002, the country negotiated an all- inclusive power-sharing
agreement with the rebel forces and the central government. On June 30, 2003, President
Kabila announced the formation of a new transitional government. However, ongoing
violence and armed conflict continued to occur in the eastern part of the DRC.43
¶12
The new Congolese Parliament convened for the first time on August 22, 2003. 44
On December 18, 2005, eighty percent of Congolese voters accepted a draft Constitution
in a country-wide referendum. 45 Reportedly, however, the East remained lawless; days
after the referendum, UN and Congolese soldiers attacked militiamen in Ituri. 46
¶13
Kabila faced opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and thirty-one others in a
presidential election on July 30, 2006. 47 Since no candidate obtained a majority of the
popular vote, 48 a run-off election between Kabila, who had the most votes, and Bemba,
the runner- up, was held October 29, 2006. 49 Kabila won the run-off election with fiftyeight percent of the vote. Bemba challenged the result, claiming election fraud and other
37

Id.
Id.
39
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 12.
40
U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra note 21.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (October 23, 2003)
[hereinafter U.N. Panel of Experts 2003 Report].
45
A giant leap forward, THE ECONOMIST , Jan. 7, 2006, at 49.
46
Id.
47
Edmund Sanders, Congo Plans Runoff Vote for October, LOS A NGELES TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006.
48
Id.
49
Eoin Young, DRC Supreme Court Confirms J. Kabila as President, MONUC.ORG, Nov. 27, 2006,
http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=13260.
38
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irregularities. On November 27, 2006, the DRC Supreme Court confirmed Kabila as the
winner of the election. 50
D. The Fight for Gold in the Ituri District after the Congolese Wars
¶14

The withdrawal of foreign troops in 2002-03 led to a battle between local armed
groups contending for control of the gold mining areas. 51 The armed groups drew the
battle lines along ethnic lines; locals of the Hema tribe sided with the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC), while those of the Lendu tribe sided with the Nationalist and
Integrationist Front (FNI). 52 Rwanda and Uganda directly and indirectly supported these
rebel groups, shifting their alliances depending on circumstances. The common uniting
factor among all conflicting factions was to control the gold in the area. 53 Control of the
gold ensured that the warring factions would have the means for buying guns and
carrying on the conflict. 54
¶15
In April 2003, dialogues chaired by the UN led to the formation of the Ituri Interim
Administration (IIA), but this body proved ineffective. 55 In May 2003, the armed groups,
under pressure from the national government and MONUC, made an empty pledge to
support the peace process, and fighting continued. 56 Even as the new Congolese
Parliament met on August 22, 2003, “that period also witnessed intensified fighting…
notably in the Ituri District.”57 In June 2004, the IIA dissolved, and the nationa l
government restored local administrative structures. 58 The national government
appointed administrators who had no connection to the armed groups and were unable to
exercise control over the armed groups. In January 2005, six leaders of the Ituri armed
groups became generals in the Congolese army after a presidential decree in late 2004. 59
E. Account of Specific Atrocities Related to Gold Mining in Ituri Starting in Early 2003
¶16

In early 2003, AngloGold Ashanti started discussing its gold mining exploration
plans for the Ituri District with the transitional government of the DRC. Around the same
time, the FNI, the armed group associated with the Lendu tribe and supported by Uganda,
sought to gain control of the gold- mining town of Mongbwalu in Ituri from the rival
Hema-affiliated UPC.60 From March to May 2003, the FNI committed a massacre at
Kilo, en route to Mongbwalu, killing at least 100 civilians presumed to be of Nyali
ethnicity whom the FNI accused of helping the rival Hema ethnic group. 61 Ugandan
50

Id.
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 20.
52
Id. at 10.
53
Id. at 21.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
U.N. Panel of Experts 2003 Report, supra note 44, at ¶ 44.
58
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 22.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 35.
61
Id. (The NGO Human Rights Watch conducted six research missions to Africa and Europe in 2004 and
2005 in preparing its report, entitled The Curse of Gold, regarding the human rights situation related to gold
mining in the northeast Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Researchers interviewed several
victims and witnesses in the DRC. Id. at 9. The accounts of human rights abuses mentioned in this section
51

241

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

¶17

¶18

¶19

¶20

[2007

forces supported the FNI combatants,62 and on March 13, 2003, the joint force reached
Mongbwalu and set up a military camp under the command of the Ugandan army. 63
On May 1, 2003, the Ugandan army withdrew and handed over control of
Mongbwalu to the FNI. 64 On May 12, 2003, in Mongbwalu, FNI combatants shot and
killed two MONUC observers who were attempting to evacuate the area. 65
On June 10, 2003, the rival UPC retook Mongbwalu, commencing what has
become known as the “48 Hour War,” lasting until June 12, 2003. 66 The FNI then pushed
back the UPC, using weapons left behind by the Ugandan soldiers who had departed in
May. The warring factions killed an estimated 500 people, many of whom were
civilians.
From July to September 2003, FNI combatants attacked several Hema villages to
the east of Mongbwalu, killing scores of civilians and forcing thousands to flee. 67 From
June 2003 to April 2004, FNI combatants conducted “witch hunts” for Hema women and
for those accused of protecting the Hema. 68 They held “Godza ceremonies,” in which
they claimed the Lendu spirit Godza told them to kill the Hema women. The FNI killed
seventy civilians, whom the combatants accused of witchcraft, from at least seven
towns. 69
The FNI’s tactics for controlling the gold involved forced labor. The FNI
organized forced community labor known as “salongo,” initially requiring two full days a
week, though eventually reducing the requirement to once a week for three hours. 70 The
FNI enforced salongo by arbitrary beatings, arrests, fines, or even death. 71 The FNI took
control of the gold mines in Mongbwalu, charged artisanal miners a fee, and took gold
from miners. 72 The FNI used taxes from the mines to buy weapons and traded gold for
weapons. 73
III. ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI’S (AGA’S ) ACTIVITIES IN THE ITURI DISTRICT
A. AngloGold Ashanti’s (AGA’s) Corporate Profile

¶21

AngloGold Ashanti formed from the merger of AngloGold Limited and Ashanti
Goldfields Limited, completed April 26, 2004. 74 The company’s headquarters are located
are detailed more thoroughly in the Human Rights Watch report, and come directly from first-hand
accounts of victims and witnesses .)
62
Id. at 35. While the Ugandan forces attempted to limit FNI abuses, “they neither disarmed the
combatants nor ended their military alliance with them.” Id. at 37.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 44.
66
Id. at 38.
67
Id. at 40.
68
Id. at 41.
69
Id. at 42.
70
Id. at 46, 48.
71
Id. at 48.
72
Id. at 49.
73
Id. at 52-53.
74
AngloGold Ashanti Corporate Fact Sheet 2004,
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/NR/rdonlyres/CAF704E0-DB15-4DE5-833F9C26ACA999BA/0/AGACorporate.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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in Johannesburg, South Africa. With operations on four continents, including Africa,
North America, South America, and Australia, the company employs more than 60,000
people, including permanent employees and contractors. Anglo American (AA), a
British diversified mining company, effectively has a fifty-one percent interest in the
independently managed AngloGold Ashanti, though Anglo American has appointed
Goldman Sachs to sell AGA. 75 AngloGold Ashanti is a power player in the global gold
mining industry; the company is Africa’s foremost gold producer, and one of the world’s
leading resources companies. 76 AGA’s corporate values state that the company “strive[s]
to form partnerships with host communities, sharing their environments, traditions and
values. [The company] want[s] the communities to be better off for AngloGold Ashanti's
having been there.”77
B. AGA’s History in the Northeast DRC
¶22

In 1998, Ashanti Goldfields purchased a stake in a mining lease agreement with
OKIMO, the DRC’s state-run mining office. 78 The concession from OKIMO, known as
Concession 40, covered over 8,000 square kilometers in the heart of Ituri with
Mongbwalu at its center. 79 After the merger of Ashanti Goldfields with AngloGold, the
company now operates in the DRC through a subsidiary called AngloGold Ashanti Kilo
(AGK), a joint venture between AngloGold Ashanti and OKIMO, which owns a 13.8%
non-contributory share. 80 The company currently considers its Ituri operation as a
“Greenfields Explorations Area,” meaning it plans “to discover new mines in new
areas.”81 In 2004, AGA spent $2 million on exploration activities in the DRC. 82
C. AGK’s Mine Exploration Activities in the Ituri District

¶23

AGK started to lay the groundwork for its decision to start a mining exploration
camp in Mongbwalu in 2003. Early that year, the company held discussions with the
transitional government, OKIMO, MONUC, and other parties with a view to
75

John Waples and Mark Kleinman, Anglo American Begins Huge Demerger, THE A USTRALIAN TIMES,
January 16, 2006, available at
http://theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17832216%255E643,00.html . Anglo
American’s fifty-one percent interest consists of a 41.8 percent direct interest, with the remainder held by
Anglo South Africa Capital (Proprietary) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Anglo American. Press
Release, Anglo American, Completion of Offering of AngloGold Ashanti Ordinary Shares (Apr. 20, 2006).
Anglo American has not yet sold its complete interest in AngloGold Ashanti, and some analysts speculate
that buyers may look to dismember AGA. Martin Creamer, Analysts Foresee Possible AngloGold Break up in $5bn Share Sale, M INING WEEKLY, Mar. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.miningweekly.co.za/article.php?a_id=106095.
76
AngloGold Ashanti Corporate Fact Sheet 2004, supra note 74.
77
AngloGold Ashanti: About Our Business Principles: Living Our Values,
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/Values (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
78
A NGLOGOLD A SHANTI, A NGLOGOLD A SHANTI’S A CTIVITIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO 3, available at http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/NR/rdonlyres/A7AD9DFE-293B-4BF3-ADAFA6A9B4658F83/0/AGA_and_the_DRC.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
79
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 57.
80
A NGLOGOLD A SHANTI, supra note 78, at 2.
81
Anglogold Ashanti: Exploration, http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/About/Exploration.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2007).
82
Id.
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commencing an exploration program in Mongbwalu. 83 This timing is concurrent with the
FNI massacre of civilians at Kilo. By July 2003, several reports about the grave human
rights abuses in the northeast DRC were publicly available. 84 Steve Lenahan of AGA
admits to knowing “that the FNI was one of many militia[s] that were accused of [human
rights] atrocities.”85 Moreover, in July 2003, International Criminal Court Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced that he would follow the situation in Ituri as part of his
investigation into alleged crimes in the DRC.86
¶24
In October 2003, AGK representatives met again with transitional government
officials to discuss intentions to start gold exploration drilling in Mongbwalu. 87 In
November 2003, the company sent two Congolese professional exploration employees to
Mongbwalu to establish the infrastructure necessary for an exploration camp. 88 In
December 2004, AGA deployed an exploration team at Mongbwalu after discussions
with DRC government officials and other parties. 89 In January 2005, AGA commenced
exploration drilling in Concession 40. 90
D. AGA’s Record of Corporate Social Responsibility
1. Important Contributions to Sustainable Development
¶25

AGA has made several important contributions to sustainable development in the
northeast DRC. 91 In 2004, AGA provided a local hospital in Mongbwalu with supplies of
drugs, other consumables, and equipment, and replaced the hospital’s water pump and
piping. The company has provided equipment and supplies to schools, and has helped
repair roads and a drainage system. In May 2004, AGA helped maintain the Budana
hydroelectric plant, serving towns in Ituri including Mongbwalu. AGA has also provided
assistance for local community events. 92
2. AGA’s Potential Link to Human Rights Atrocities

¶26

Presumably, AngloGold Ashanti bears responsibility for the acts of its subsidiary,
AngloGold Kilo. People seeking to hold AGA responsible for the acts of AGK may have
to determine whether AGK is a proxy for AGA under corporate or agency law principles.
The remainder of this paper assumes AGA is liable for the acts of AGK.

83

A NGLOGOLD A SHANTI, supra note 78, at 3.
See Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 58 & n.186, 110 & n.425 (sources include two detailed reports by
Human Rights Watch; a report by International Crisis Group entitled Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in
Ituri; a report by the U.N. Security Council entitled Special Report on Events in Ituri; and numerous press
reports in Swiss newspapers).
85
Interview with Steve Lenahan, supra note 1.
86
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i) AGK’s Interactions with the FNI
¶27
Human Rights Watch alleges that AGK had to set up a relationship with the FNI,
since the FNI maintained de facto control over mines in Ituri, despite AGK’s contract
with and support from the transitional government. 93 In late 2003 in the national capital
in Kinshasa, AGK representatives met with FNI leader Floribert Njabu, who indicated his
support for AGK to commence work in Mongbwalu. 94 Later interactions included the
visit of company representatives to Mongbwalu in November 2003, and February and
March 2004, accompanied by FNI representatives who claim to have agreed to provide
security to AGK. 95 These visits to Mongbwalu occurred in the face of warnings against
visiting the area from the administrator of the IIA and the head of the MONUC office in
Bunia. 96 AGA denies receiving a warning from MONUC. 97 By March 2004, a company
representative documented internally that he acknowledged that the FNI would allow the
company to operate in the area. 98 AGA knew about the FNI’s human rights violations, 99
as press and other reports were publicly available. 100
¶28
AGA claims that it did not establish a relationship with the FNI, and that any
encounters with the FNI were unavoidable. 101 Interestingly, Steve Lenahan of AngloGold
Ashanti admits that AGA “had contacts with the FNI,” though in “the same way [the
company] had contacts with MONUC and the [Congolese] government.”102 The FNI
initiated “much of the contact,” not AGA, since the FNI “had an interest in trying to
understand” what AGA was doing in Ituri. 103
ii) Specific Incidents with the FNI
a)

Funding to the FNI
¶29
In January 2005, AGA paid the FNI $8000 to support a trip to Kinshasa. 104 AGA
claims it made the payment “under protest and duress” after FNI had threatened the
safety of its staff and company assets. 105 AGA admitted such payments were inconsistent
with business principles. 106 AGA closed down its operation in Ituri for seven weeks after
this incident, 107 and returned once MONUC had established its base in Mongbwalu. 108
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Additionally, from February to October 2004, AGA paid $1100 in freight landing
taxes to the FNI. 109 AGA claims it initially thought that the transitional government
received these payments, based on the fact that the transitional government’s stamp
appeared on some receipts. 110 AGA stopped these payments when it became aware that
the payments arguably contravened a UN arms embargo. 111
b)

Transportatio n to the FNI
¶31
AGA allegedly provided ground transport to FNI representatives, who often used
AGA’s four-by- four vehicle. 112 AGA claims the FNI’s use of its vehicle occurred under
duress of threats of abuse and assault. 113 Additionally, AGA allegedly provided the FNI
with air transport, in that AGA permitted FNI representatives to travel on planes hired for
flights leaving Mongbwalu. 114 However, AGA claims it had no formal arrangement with
the FNI to provide transportation, and independent commercial charter airlines sold seats
to anyone willing to pay, including FNI representatives. 115
c)

Housing to the FNI
¶32
FNI leader Njabu lived in a house on the AGK concession that was guarded by FNI
combatants, some of them child soldiers, and was used as FNI headquarters. 116 AGA
confirmed that the FNI occupied several houses on the company’s property, but without
AGA’s permission or approval. 117 Further, AGA claims the FNI took occupation of some
houses on the concession before AGK established its exploration camp. 118
d)

Political clout to the FNI
¶33
Few national politicians took interest in the FNI until AGA expressed its desire to
start mining in Mongbwalu. 119 A Congolese senator feared that the relationship between
the FNI and AGA would strengthen the FNI politically, and was “dangerous.”120 Further,
a decree from President Kabila integrated one of the FNI senior commanders, Gode
Sukpa, as a general in the new Congolese army in January 2005.
iii) Debate over the Timing of AGA’s Decision to Begin Mine Exploration Activities in
Ituri
¶34
Human Rights Watch has alleged that AGA should have waited until “a legitimate
government authority” took charge before proceeding with its mine exploration activities,
“rather than dealing with armed groups implicated in gross human rights violations.”121
109
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AGA’s Steve Le nahan gave some credence to this view when he acknowledged the
possibility that his company “got [its] timing wrong,” though he guardedly stated so since
no guarantees existed that no other incidents with the FNI would have occurred if his
company had waited for MONUC to actually establish a base. 122 However, CEO Bobby
Godsell does not agree that companies should stay out of the DRC until the democratic
processes are firmly entrenched, claiming that “[t]he DRC government sees economic
growth as an integral part of transformation and the African Union encourages it.”123
Godsell notes that “[t]he crux of the matter is whether the development of a gold mine
would be good or bad for the peace process in the DRC.”124 He answers that question in
the affirmative, so long as his company does not “have to give succour to armed
groups.”125
¶35
Consistent with AGA’s analysis, many NGOs also recognize the importance that
the private sector plays in contributing to sustainable development. 126 MNCs influence
government policy and practice, often with the aim of protecting their investments. 127
This influence may have the positive result of creating the stability necessary for
sustainable development.
E. AGA’s Current Plan for the DRC
Following the deployment of the MONUC base in Mongbwalu, the
signing of an agreement by the transitional government and armed militia
groups in the regions, as well as its own detailed in loco investigations,
AngloGold Ashanti has concluded that, under current circumstances, the
company can continue to comply with its commercial and social
responsibilities in the north eastern DRC with integrity. 128
¶36

AGA will continue to fast-track exploration in 2007, and plans to conduct a
feasibility study in 2008 that it hopes will allow it to commence construction of a mine in
2009.129 In February 2006, OKIMO said that “AGA should accelerate its exploration
plans in the DRC.”130
¶37
Another mining company with interests in the Ituri region, Mvelaphanda Resources
(Mvela) decided not to get involved in operations in Ituri after a strategic review of
operations. 131 However, AGA believes that it can continue to operate in Ituri with
integrity. 132 Steve Lenahan insisted that “if… we make the judgment that it’s not possible
122
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to do business there with integrity, we will leave the next day.”133 He also notes that even
after the publication of the Human Rights Watch report, The Curse of Gold, in June 2005,
“nobody, and this includes Human Rights Watch, told us to leave.”134
¶38
The decision to operate in Ituri is one that the company will continuously
monitor. 135 CEO Bobby Godsell has pledged that “AngloGold Ashanti does not and will
not support militia,”136 and has promised that “there should be no economic activity if we
have to pay bribes.”137 Human Rights Watch has welcomed “AngloGold Ashanti’s
commitment to suspend their operations if it requires supporting [armed] groups
[implicated in gross human rights violations] in the future.”138
¶39
In October 2005, AngloGold Ashanti agreed to renegotiate its contract with
OKIMO.139 Okimo CEO Viktor Kasongo noted that he wanted to correct what the DRC
government deemed an “imbalance of interests.”140 In March 2007, the DRC mines
minister, Martin Kabwelulu, announced plans to review the AGA contract, which AGA
supports. 141
¶40
The Lutundula Parliamentary Commission Report, released in February 2006, calls
for the renegotiation of the mining convention between OKIMO and AGA in order to
readjust the shares of participation in the partnership. 142 Further, the report orders the
suspension of mining activities in the OKIMO concessions because mining companies
must cooperate with the militiamen to do business. 143 The report is the product of the
Lutundula Commission, a special DRC National Assembly commission led by
parliamentarian Christophe Lutundula, charged with investiga ting mining and other
business contracts that rebels and government authorities signed between 1996 and 2003
during the Congo wars. The report, initially submitted to the National Assembly in June
2005, found that “dozens of contracts are either illegal or of limited value for the
development of the country and it recommends their termination or renegotiation. ”144
Further, the report calls for judicial action against several senior political and corporate
actors involved in these operations, 145 though the report does not implicate any officials
from AngloGold Ashanti. 146
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F. Summary of AGA’s Potential Link to Human Rights Abuses

¶41

From early 2003 to the present, the FNI has killed civilians and used forced labor in
its attempt to control the gold mining trade in Ituri. Concurrently, AngloGold Ashanti
has engaged in mine exploration activities in the area. The two groups have interacted,
meeting several times in 2003 and 2004. AGA claims that all contacts with the FNI were
unavoidable; the FNI, on the other hand, claims that AGA sought its permission to
operate in Ituri. AGA claims that any money or other support it gave to the FNI was
either under duress or without AGA’s permission, and the company made any such
decisions, though contrary to AGA’s policies, in the interest of protecting employees.
However, AGA was aware of the FNI’s deplorable record on human rights, and perhaps
should have realized that any contact with the FNI would give the armed militia implicit
support.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NORMS CONCERNING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. Explanation of Norms
1. Public International Norms and Provisions

¶42

¶43

Several organizations have developed international norms and provisions that apply
in the context of business and human rights. These norms involve several different
actors, including states, MNCs, and civil society organizations. Many of these initiatives
are voluntary, which to some extent helps to induce participation. 147
i) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
Participants to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary
Principles) “have developed [a] set of voluntary principles to guide Companies in
maintaining the safety and security of their operations within an operating framework that
ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”148 The Voluntary
Principles operate in the areas of risk assessment, public security, and private security.
Participants include the governments of the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway,
companies in the extractive and energy industries, and human rights NGOs. 149 Anglo
American joined the Voluntary Principles in January 2005, 150 and AGA claims that the
Voluntary Principles guide its actions in the “context of the DRC and on the particular
issue of operating in politically sensitive regions or areas of potential conflict.”151 Since

147
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AngloGold Ashanti’s (AGA’s) activities do not involve public or private security matters,
only the Risk Assessment principles are relevant to this analysis.
¶44
The principles for Risk Assessment advise companies to consider several factors, 152
including:
§
§

§
§

Potential for violence: “Risk assessments should examine patterns
of violence in areas of Company operations,” which can be
“limited to particular regions ;”
Human rights records: “Risk assessments should consider the
available human rights records of … paramilitaries,” and
“[a]wareness of past abuses and allegations can help Companies to
avoid recurrences as well as to promote accountability;”
Rule of law: “Risk assessments should consider the local
prosecuting authority and judiciary’s capacity to hold accountable
those responsible for human rights abuses;” and
Conflict analysis: Participating companies should “[i]dentif[y] and
understand [ ] the root causes and nature of local conflicts, as well
as the level of adherence to human rights and international
humanitarian law standards by key actors” when developing
strategies for managing relations with stakeholders.

ii) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises
¶45
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) are recommendations of voluntary
principles and standards for responsible business conduct addressed by governments to
MNCs.153 Observance by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable. 154 The
OECD Guidelines endorse policies that include respect for the human rights of those
affected by company activities and abstention from any improper involvement in local
political activities. 155 The OECD Guidelines call for member states, through stateappointed National Contact Points (NCPs), to investigate any allegations of violations of
the Guidelines. 156 While neither South Africa nor the DRC are OECD members, the
United Kingdom, where Anglo American is based, is an OECD member. 157 Further, the
OECD Guidelines encourage NCPs to respond to specific instances from non-adhering
countries. 158
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iii) UN Global Compact
¶46
The UN Global Compact calls for collective action among governme nts,
companies, and international labor and civil society organizations to promote responsible
corporate citizenship. 159 The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative. 160 Principles apply
to the areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. 161 The human
rights principles are:162
§
§

Businesses should support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of
influence; and
Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in human
rights abuses.

AGA subscribes to the principles of the Global Compact. 163

¶47

iv) Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines
“The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a multi-stakeholder process and
independent institution whose mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.” 164 Organizations subscribing to the GRI process
voluntarily use the Guidelines to report on the economic, environmental, and social
dimensions of their activities, products, and services. 165 The social performance indicator
focuses on human rights, 166 and calls for qualitative data. 167 Participants include
representatives from business, accountancy, investment, environmental, human rights,
research and labor organizations. 168 GRI is an official collaborating center of the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and works in cooperation with the UN Global
Compact. 169 AGA joined the GRI as an Organizational Stakeholder in September
2004.170
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v) International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work
¶48
The International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (Fundamental Principles) is a “commitment by
governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations to uphold basic human values.”171
The Fundamental Principles state that ILO members have an obligation to respect, to
promote, and to realize principles concerning fundamental rights including freedom of
association, collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, abolition of child labor,
and elimination of discrimination in employment. 172 However, since the scope of the
ILO’s mandate is limited to conditions arising out of the employment relationship, 173 the
Fundamental Principles are not relevant to AGA’s activities in the DRC.
vi) UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms)
¶49
The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) reaffirm that
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have human rights obligations
and responsibilities. 174 Transnational corporations have general obligations, within their
sphere of activity and influence, “to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure
respect of and protect human rights.”175 The UN Norms derive their obligations from
standards that apply to corporate activity, including international human rights
instruments, binding conventions, and charters. 176
¶50
The implementation mechanism calls for corporations to create and implement
internal policies that comply with the UN Norms. 177 The UN and other appropriate
organizations may independently review corporate activities, 178 while states should
establish the legal and administrative framework to support implementation. 179 The UN
Norms require companies found to be in violation to pay reparations to affected parties,
as assessed by national courts or international tribunals. 180
¶51
Steve Lenahan of AGA claims that the UN Norms are a set of principles that have
no validity and have not been ratified by anybody. 181 He might not be alone in his
171
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analysis. Though the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a 2005 resolution that
appointed a special representative to “identify and clarify standards of corporate
responsibility and accountability,” in accord with the Commission’s implicit recognition
of the UN Norms, 182 the United States, Australia, and South Africa, opposed it. 183 The
United States feared that “an anti-business agenda would hold back economic and social
advancement in developing nations and claimed that the resolution was formulated in a
negative tone towards business.”184
2. Extractive Industry Norms
¶52

¶53

In his Plenary Remarks at the World Mines Ministries Forum in Toronto, Canada,
on March 3, 2006, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights, John Ruggie, observed that “fragments of collaborative governance are
emerging in a variety of areas, specifically tailored for their characteristic dilemma
situations.”185 However, he also warned that “these arrangements have weaknesses,” one
of which is that “most choose their own definitions and standards of human rights,” a
choice informed as much by “what is politically acceptable within and among the
participating entities tha n with objective human rights needs.”186 Ruggie was likely
referring to the extractive industry, which has developed its own standards regarding
human rights norms.
i) International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Principles
Starting in May 2003, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has
encouraged corporate members to measure their performance against ten sustainable
development principles. 187 The third principle is to “[u]phold fundamental human rights
and respect cultures, customs and values in dealings with employees and others who are
affected by [member] activities.” 188 Under this principle the ICMM advises companies to
“[r]espect the culture and heritage of local communities” and to avoid the use of forced
labor. 189 ICMM members commit to report their human rights performance against the
ICMM Principles in accord with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Mining and
Metals Sector Supplement and the 2002 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. 190 The
ICMM launched a pilot assurance procedure in May 2006 to provide independent
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assurance that members are meeting their commitments. 191 AGA CEO Bobby Godsell
serves on the ICMM Executive Committee. 192
ii) International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions
(ICEM) Agreement with AngloGold Ltd.
¶54
On September 13, 2002, AngloGold CEO Bobby Godsell signed an agreement with
the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions
(ICEM), applicable to all AngloGold mines worldwide. 193 The parties agreed to promote
both “universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all” and “good relationships with local communities.”194 The Agreement, effective once
signed “unless otherwise agreed or amended,”195 pledged to implement a sub-committee
“to consider plans and proposals placed before it by either party following any alleged
breach of accepted standards of conduct that could not be resolved at the level of local
and national operation. ”196
iii) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
¶55
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) “supports improved
governance in resource-rich countries through the full publication and verification of
company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining.”197 “The EITI is
a multi-stakeholder initiative, with partners from governments, international
organizations, companies, NGOs, investors, and business and industrial organizations.”198
The EITI Principles call for greater transparency and accountability in payments and
revenues through disclosure by companies and governments. 199 The EITI Criteria include
regular publication of payments by companies to governments and revenues received by
governments from companies, and independent audits reconciling the payments and
revenues. 200
¶56
On November 18, 2005, DRC President Kabila signed a decree that set up a
committee to implement the EITI principles and criteria. 201 Anglo American endorsed
the EITI at its launch in Johannesburg at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
in 2002. 202 AngloGoldAshanti, as an independently managed subsidiary of Anglo
191
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Transparency Initiative, http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/article/?afw_source_key=F5C1CDD7-EA6E-
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American, is involved in EITI processes in Ghana, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic
of Congo. 203
¶57

iv) The New DRC Mining Code
The DRC government draft ed a new Mining Code in 2003 in conjunction with the
World Bank. 204 The Code aims to facilitate privatization and international investment,
while reserving artisanal mining for Congolese nationals only. 205
B. Evaluation of AngloGold Ashanti’s Activities in the DRC Compared to the Norms
Concerning Corporate Responsibility and Accountability for Human Rights Violations
1. Public International Law Norms and Provisions

¶58

¶59

i) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles)
AngloGold Ashanti’s actions appear to violate the Risk Assessment Principles of
the Voluntary Principles. AGA appears to have failed to consider both the violence in the
Ituri area and the deplorable human rights record of the FNI armed group, and neglected
to determine the root causes of the local conflict. The initial participants of the Voluntary
Principles met to discuss “concerns about whether companies should be operating at all
in certain countries with deplorable human rights record [sic].”206 Therefore, if AGA
were truly adhering to the purpose of the Voluntary Principles, they might have made the
decision not to begin exploration activities in Ituri. The Voluntary Principles, by
incorporating UN instruments that codify international human rights norms, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, subject companies to those norms and treaty
obligations. 207 But, to the extent that a company’s individual contracts do not reference
the Voluntary Principles, which would render them legally binding, the Voluntary
Principles may merely be hortatory for that company. 208 AGA has not updated its
contract with OKIMO, which dates back to 1998, since it started following the Voluntary
Principles in 2005. Further, no mechanism for third-party monitoring of implementation
of the Voluntary Principles exists, so this approach is unlikely to be effective. 209
ii) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The UN Panel of Experts Report on Illegal Resource Exploitation in the DRC
concluded in October 2002 that the activities of Ashanti Goldfields (AG), AGA’s
predecessor, in the DRC may have violated the OECD Guidelines, and included AG in a
list of eighty- five companies which the panel considered in breach of the OECD

48B6-AD03-A780616BD6EE&xsl_menu_parent=/corporateresponsibilty/internationalcommitments/eiti/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
203
Id.
204
S. African Dev. Cmty. [SADC] Review: DRC Mining Industry,
http://www.sadcreview.com/country_profiles/drc/drc_mining.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
205
Helene La Roux, Turning Congo’s Mineral ‘Curse’ into a Rainbow of Hope, M INING W EEKLY, Sep. 16,
2005.
206
Cynthia Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J.
INT ’L. L. & POL. 457, 477 (2004).
207
Id. at 481.
208
Id. at 482.
209
Id. at 483.
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Guidelines. 210 This report does not give any indication as to what AG’s alleged violations
of the Guidelines entail. 211 AG’s response included a denial, stating that its record of
activities was clean and that it should not have been named as a company in violation of
the Guidelines. 212 The UN Panel of Experts later concluded in its October 2003 final
report that the issues with Ashanti Goldfields had been resolved and that no further action
was needed, though it provided no information as to the context of the resolution. 213
However, the 2003 report also maintained that a company’s status as “resolved” should
not be seen as invalidating the earlier findings with regard to the activities of the named
companies. 214 The UN Security Council asked individual countries to follow up on Panel
findings. 215
¶60
Whether AG’s activities directly violated the OECD Guidelines remains unclear.
One can argue that dealing with the FNI was an improper foray into the local political
situation, and that any dealing with the FNI indirectly and negatively impacted the human
rights of local people. However, MNCs are not required to adhere to the OECD
Guidelines, and no sanctions apply to a company’s failure to adhere. 216 Victims would
have to first file a complaint with the appropriate NCP, whose determination on the issue
would be final and not subject to appeal. 217 This approach is unlikely to be effective
based on the “resolved” status of the previous accusations of the UN Panel of Experts;
however, AGA’s continued activities in the DRC since the 2003 report raise concerns
about violations of the OECD Guidelines. 218
iii) UN Global Compact
¶61
AGA’s activities appear to violate the spirit of the Global Compact, in that AGA’s
choice to operate in the region has caused it to become indirectly linked to human rights
violations. The company has therefore failed to help protect huma n rights within its
sphere of influence, and may even be complicit in abuses. However, since the Global
Compact relies more on moral persuasion than on legal norms, as evidenced by the
deliberate lack of enforcement mechanisms, this approach is unlikely to be effective. 219
Corporations generally understand that their decision to support the principles of the
Global Compact is an “aspirational commitment” that neither legally binds the company
nor creates a duty toward third parties. 220

210

Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex III, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002); see
also All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region [APPG], The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and the DRC, 8 (2005).
211
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 121.
212
Addendum to the Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Response No. 15, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1146/Add.1 (June 20, 2003).
213
U.N. Panel of Experts Report, supra note 44, at Annex I.
214
Id. at ¶ 23.
215
APPG, supra note 210, at 8.
216
Choudhury, supra note 147, at 64.
217
Id.
218
Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 2, at 76.
219
Bunn, supra note 126, at 1283.
220
Halina Ward, The Interface between Globalisation, Corporate Responsibility, and the Legal Profession,
1 U. ST . THOMAS L.J. 813, 831 (2004).
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iv) Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines
¶62
The GRI Guidelines are a reporting mechanism, so AGA is unlikely to be in
violation of them.
v) UN Norms
¶63
Again, AGA’s activities appear to violate the spirit of the UN Norms, in that the
company has not done everything in its power to promote human rights within its sphere
of activity and influence. However, the implementation mechanism of the UN Norms is
weak, lacking specificity as to which international and domestic actors will play a
monitoring role. 221 Further, the UN Norms provide no guidance as to procedural and
jurisdictional issues, such as which courts may assess damages, how they should do so,
and which court’s rules apply. 222 Additionally, the UN Norms have no legal standing. 223
While this approach may be ineffective, “the [UN] Norms’ legalistic nature and proposed
enforcement mechanism result in a vast improvement over other codes of conduct.”224
2. Extractive Industry Norms
¶64

i) ICMM
While AGA has not used forced labor, which the ICMM principles denigrate, the
company did not take action to prevent the use of forced labor by the FNI. Though the
extent of the commitment to uphold fundamental human rights may be disputed, AGA
arguably violated that commitment by failing to take action to prevent FNI abuses.
However, since procedures for compliance with the ICMM Principles are in a pilot phase
as of this writing, the ICMM may not be able to hold a member accountable for violating
these principles.

ii) ICEM Agreement with AngloGold Limited
¶65
While some unions have put the ICEM Agreement with Anglo Gold “to the test,”225
whether the parties have created the sub-committee they pledged to implement in the
Agreement is unclear. Nothing in the Agreement explicitly prevents the local community
in Ituri from attempting to hold AGA responsible for its activities in the DRC, despite the
limitation that the Agreement “apply to operations, wherever situated, over which
AngloGold has direct managerial control. ”226 The local community members would
likely have to file a complaint with both the ICEM and with high-ranking AngloGold
Ashanti officials to achieve any result.

221

Choudhury, supra note 147, at 66.
Id. at 66-67.
223
Bunn, supra note 167, at 1285.
224
Choudhury, supra note 147, at 67.
225
GINO GOVENDER, ICEM, GLOBAL M INING, GLOBAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL UNION A CTION : ICEM 2004
W ORLD CONFERENCE FOR THE M INING INDUSTRIES 39 (2004) (describing successful lobbying efforts by
two unions to convince the CEO to allow union officials to have access to workers in Tanzania).
226
AngloGold-ICEM Agreement, supra note 194, at § 2 (emphasis added). Essentially, the local Ituri
community would argue that AngloGold Ashanti has direct managerial control over its subsidiary,
AngloGold Kilo.
222
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iii) EITI
¶66
The EITI merely regulates disclosure by a company, not the company’s behavior. 227
Moreover, the process is still being implemented in the DRC, and is thus an ineffective
avenue for redress.
¶67

iv) The New DRC Mining Code
Viewed by some as a failure that is “little used and unknown in the country,” the
new DRC Mining Code “is not evenly applied to new mining partners.”228 Other critics
complain that the drafters designed the Code to attract new foreign investors while
neglecting to support local industry. 229 Moreover, the codes are hardly applied, especially
in the absence of the rule of law. 230 Thus, the new DRC Mining Code does not provide
an effective avenue for redress.
C. Analysis of Accountability

¶68

In the end, the true measure of AGA’s accountability for its actions may lie in the
realm of public opinion. 231 In light of the fact that AGA has decided to subscribe to
several international norms, public opinion may be warranted in finding that AGA is
disingenuous in its commitment to corporate social responsibility. Perhaps “paying lipservice to the idea of good corporate citizenship” is all AGA ever intended to achieve. 232
After all, AGA claims to commit to these international standards, yet gets involved in
situations where it seeks to profit in a conflict zone like the northeast DRC marked by
grave human rights abuses.
¶69
However, AGA has made significant improvements to the infrastructure of
Mongbwalu. Further, Steve Lenahan fears that if AGA were to pull out of the DRC, his
company would be replaced by less reputable gold mining companies who would not
care about human rights. 233 Sam Jonah, AngloGold Ashanti’s president at the time of the
Human Rights Watch report, echoed Mr. Lenahan’s fears, warning that those wishing to
keep their hands clean by advocating economic removal “may end up with far dirtier
hands than [AngloGold Ashanti’s].”234 At the very least, public opinion must determine
whether having a reputable gold mining company operate in the northeast DRC is the
lesser of two evils.
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Williams, supra note 206, at 498.
William Church, DRC Mining Sector a Disaster, RWANDA NEW TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, available at
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(Jan. 22, 2005).
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V. LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOLDING ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DRC
A. Criminal Law Approaches
1. International Criminal Court (ICC)
¶70

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 235 The ICC can only exercise its
jurisdiction if: the state on whose territory the alleged violation took place is a party to
the Rome statute; if the person the Court is investigating is a national of a state party to
the Rome statute; or if a state that is a non-state party to the Rome statute has accepted
the Court’s jurisdiction. 236 Since the Court’s jurisdiction extends only to natural and not
to legal persons, 237 the ICC has no jurisdiction over corporations. 238 The ICC might hold
liable corporate officials in leadership positions, 239 whom the corporation might then
indemnify. 240
¶71
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, 241 and the Court only has
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the statute’s entry into force. 242 The DRC is a
state party to the Rome Statute. 243 In July 2003, the Prosecutor of the ICC announced that
he would closely follow the situation in the DRC. 244 The Office of the Prosecutor then
analyzed the situation in the DRC, with a focus on crimes committed in the Ituri
region. 245 On April 19, 2004, the President of the DRC referred to the Prosecutor of the
ICC “the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed
anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome statute.”246
The ICC opened an investigation of the DRC on June 23, 2004. 247 The Prosecutor has not
brought charges against corporate officials in this case.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome Statute], art. 5, § 1 (1998). The
Court will eventually have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the ICC defines the crime.
236
Rome Statute, art. 12, § 2.
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Rome Statute, art. 25, § 1.
238
Choudhury, supra note 147, at 58-59.
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Rome Statute, art. 25; see also Michael Chertoff, The International Criminal Court Is Even Worse than
Its Critics Have Said, W EEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 12/Apr. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/956xhybq.asp (arguing against
bringing corporate officials before the ICC).
240
See Stephen Kabel, Comment, Our Business Is People (Even If It Kills Them): The Contribution of
Multinational Enterprises to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 TUL. J. INT ’L. &
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rights issues).
241
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
242
Rome Statute, art. 11, § 1.
243
Participants to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (last visited
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With regard to AngloGold Ashanti, the Prosecutor must determine whether he can
bring charges within the jurisdiction of the Court against high level figures within AGA
for acts committed in the DRC. The Prosecutor could establish the Court’s jurisdiction
on a territorial basis since the acts occurred in the DRC, a state party to the Rome Statute.
However, the Prosecutor would have a more difficult time deciding that AGA’s actions
meet the definition of one of the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. First, the
Prosecutor would have to allege that the FNI’s actions met the definition of one of the
crimes under the statute. The Prosecutor could conceivably argue that the FNI’s actions
meet the definition of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, though the
most likely argument is that the FNI’s actions constituted a crime against humanity
because the FNI committed murder as part of a widespread attack against a civilian
population. 248 Next, the Prosecutor would have to prove that AGA’s actions “aid[ed],
abet[ted] or otherwise assist[ed]” the FNI in the commission of a crime contemplated by
the statute. 249 Alternatively, the Prosecutor would have to show that the high level
officials of AGA had sufficient knowledge of both the FNI’s intention of committing
crimes and of AGA’s actions in the DRC. 250 Based on the facts known at this time, the
Prosecutor would have difficulty in claiming a sufficient basis to bring charges against
high level officials of AGA. The connection between AGA and the FNI is likely too
attenuated to meet the standard of aiding and abetting, and the high level officials would
likely claim that they neither sanctioned nor had knowledge of AGK’s interaction with
the FNI.
2. Domestic DRC Criminal Law

¶73

Though the DRC has passed its own anti-corruption law, an “ingrained culture” of
corruption that permeated the country under the Mobutu regime persists. 251 “Bribery is
still routine,” despite its illegal status. 252 Under these domestic conditions, pursuing
AngloGold Ashanti in the DRC is unlikely to bear positive results, especia lly since the
DRC state owns a share in the AGK joint venture. However, whether the courts in the
DRC would be willing and able to provide a forum for a meaningful prosecution is
beyond the scope of this analysis. That conclusion might impact the jurisdiction of the
ICC, which, under the complementarity principle, can only exercise jurisdiction if
territorial courts are not willing and able to provide a forum for a meaningful
prosecution. 253
3. South African Criminal Law

¶74

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, signed April 28, 2004,
defines the general offence of corruption in South Africa, and includes an act in which
any person gives money to any other person in order to act in a manner that amounts to
248

Rome Statute, arts. 6-8 (explaining the definitions of each crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction).
Rome Statute, art. 25, § 3(c).
250
Rome Statute, art. 25, § 3(d)(ii).
251
U.S. Dep’t. of State, 2006 Investment Climate Statement, Democratic Republic of Congo, Corruption,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2006/64000.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
252
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253
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either the abuse of a position of authority or a breach of trust, or the violation of a legal
duty or a set of rules. 254 The Act provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of a
corporation which allegedly meet the definition of corruption but that occurred outside
South Africa, “regardless of whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the place of
its commission.”255
¶75
AGA’s actions in relation to the payments to the FNI appear to violate the letter
of this law, though the countervailing terms of extortion and AGA’s public
acknowledgement and explanation of these actions militate against pursuing
accountability under this Act. However, other criminal approaches in South Africa may
exist. 256

254

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 s. 3, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2004/a12-04.pdf [hereinafter Corrupt Activities Act]. This section of
the Act reads:
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of that other person or for the benefit of another person,
in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner—
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(aa) the abuse of a position of authority;
(bb) a breach of trust; or
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules
is guilty of the offence of corruption.
255
Corrupt Activities Act, s. 35. This section of the Act reads:
Extraterritorial jurisdiction
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(e) any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, in the Republic.
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4. United Kingdom Criminal Law
¶76

In 2001, the UK Parliament amended its anti-corruption statutes to include acts of
corruption or bribery carried out or conducted “in a country or territory outside the
United Kingdom.”257 For acts of bribery and corruption committed outside the UK, the
law applies to a UK national or a body incorporated under the law of the UK.258
Proceedings for the offence may be taken in the UK. 259 The Act defines the offence of
corruption as “any common law offence of bribery,”260 or “the first two offences under
section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906,” which refer to bribes obtained by or
given to agents. 261
¶77
The UK would not be able to prosecute AngloGold Ashanti directly, since the
company is not incorporated under the laws of the UK. However, the UK could
conceivably prosecute Anglo American, a UK corporation and a significant stakeholder
of AGA. The UK would have to prove that Anglo American is responsible for the acts of
AGA as Anglo American’s subsidiary. 262 Further, the UK would have to prove that the
FNI served as AGA’s agent, and that AGA’s payments to the FNI constituted bribes as
defined by the first two offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
1906. A court is unlikely to find that the FNI was AGA’s agent, since AGA had no
formal contractual relationship and only limited interaction with the FNI.
B. Civil Law Approaches
1. Domestic DRC Civil Law
¶78

A civil lawsuit against AGA in the DRC would encounter many of the same issues
as a criminal lawsuit. Again, whether domestic courts in the DRC are willing and able to
hear a case against AGA is beyond the scope of this analysis.
2. United Kingdom Civil Law

¶79

The United Kingdom might be an especially valid choice of forum because Anglo
American, which has a significant interest in AngloGold Ashanti, is incorporated and
based there. Principles of extraterritorial jurisdic tion require the defendant corporation to
be an English company, or a foreign company that carries on business to a definite extent
257

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, pt. 12, § 108.
Id. § 109(1)(a).
259
Id. § 109(2)(b).
260
Id. § 109(3)(a).
261
Id. § 109(3)(c). The first two offences listed under Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906
are: “(1) If any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any
person, for himself or for any other person, any gift or consideration as an inducement or reward for doing
or for bearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or forborne to do, any act in relation to
his principal's affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in
relation to his principal's affairs or business; or
If any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gift or consideration to any agent as an
inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or
forborne to do, any act in relation to this principal's affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to
show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or business;” Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1906, c. 34, § 1.
262
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from premises based in England. 263 Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to hold AGA
accountable for human rights violations would ha ve to bring a suit against Anglo
American, as opposed to AGA, since AGA has no presence in the UK.
Few cases in the international human rights context have addressed the extent of
liability of a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary. 264 A plaint iff must convince
the court to pierce the corporate veil that shields the parent company as a corporate
shareholder from liability for the acts of its subsidiary. 265 While no set standard exists to
guide the decision, courts will look to factors including undercapitalization of the
subsidiary, failure to observe corporate formalities, or a high level of control over the
subsidiary so that the subsidiary is essentially the parent company’s alter ego. 266
Plaintiffs bringing transnational human rights tort claims face a significant challenge in
convincing a court to pierce the corporate veil. 267 Plaintiffs bringing a suit to hold Anglo
American liable for AGA’s acts in the DRC must convince the court that Anglo
American’s interest in AGA amounted to sufficient control over AGA’s activities.
Alternatively, plaintiffs may seek to hold Anglo American liable for the acts of AGA
under agency principles, though the court would have to find that Anglo American
exercised a significant amount of control over AGA. 268
Plaintiffs in the UK can bring a civil claim under customary international law,
which is part of English common law. 269 That claim must show state action unless it
involves a violation of a jus cogens norm. 270
However, plaintiffs face several concerns when bringing a suit in the UK. In the
UK, the losing party pays for the costs of litigation, which may pose a strategic limit to
the type of case that a plaintiff may bring. 271 Additionally, the UK grants extensive
sovereign immunity that may attach to state agents. 272
Most of these considerations militate against bringing a suit in the UK against AA
seeking to hold that company accountable for the acts of AGA in the DRC.
3. United States Civil Law

¶84

i) Jurisdictional Hurdles
The United States has played host to the large majority of transnational human
rights cases against corporations. 273 Plaintiffs bringing civil suits against corporations
under any statute in the United States face several preliminary hurdles on jurisdictional
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and procedural grounds which courts may use to dismiss suits. 274 First, courts must
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. A court can establish
personal jurisdiction when the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [a forum]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offe nd ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”275
¶85
A US court should have little difficulty exercising personal jurisdiction over
AngloGold Ashanti. First, AGA has operations in the US, for which it can reasonably
expect to be haled into US courts. A court will likely find that such a presence in the US
constitutes at least “minimum contacts.” Second, AGA is listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, 276 and its investor relations office in New York subjects AGA to New York
jurisdiction. 277
¶86
Another jurisdictional hurdle plaintiffs bringing a suit in the US face is the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, which allows US courts to dismiss a case if the court decides
that an alternative forum in another jurisdiction or country would best serve the public
and private interests at stake. 278 Courts give deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,
though resident plaintiffs receive greater deference than non-resident plaintiffs. 279 Courts
then apply a two-step test. 280 First, the court will determine whether an adequate
alternative forum is available. 281 Alternative fora often include the state where the
alleged abuses occurred or the state of the alien defendant’s place of incorporation. 282
However, the issue of adequacy becomes paramount in transnational human rights cases,
since governments of foreign fora are often implicated in such suits, raising concerns
about corruption in the administration of justice. 283 Second, the court weighs the public
and private interests to determine the most convenient forum. 284
¶87
Plaintiffs bringing a suit against AGA should argue that adjudication in the DRC is
subject to corruption. As for the alternative forum of South Africa, plaintiffs should
argue that the court should defer to the plaintiff’s desire to litigate in the US; that
traveling to either the US or South Africa is equally inconvenient to the plaintiffs; that the
costs to AGA of litigating in the US as opposed to South Africa are not “excessively
burdensome” in light of AGA’s vast resources; 285 and that AGA should not be surprised
by being haled into US courts based on the existence of company operations in the US.
Plaintiffs should argue that the US interest in providing a forum for the enforcement of
international human rights norms, 286 especially in the DRC, 287 outweighs any other public
interest, such as flooding the courts. 288
274
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When plaintiffs bring a suit in the US alleging some form of state action, they face
additional jurisdictional hurdles related to foreign policy. Some of these hurdles include:
the act of state doctrine, in which a US court may dismiss a suit when it must adjudicate
claims related to the official acts of a foreign state;289 the political question doctrine, in
which a US court may dismiss a suit involving a non-justiciable political question; 290 and
the international comity doctrine, in which a US court may dismiss a suit if it determines
that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable based on the interests of a foreign state
affected by the litigation. 291 These hurdles will likely play a diminished role in a suit
against AngloGold Ashanti, especially since the US State Department has found that
“serious human rights problems remain in the security services and justice system” in the
DRC. 292
ii) Alien Tort Claims Act
a)

Current Status
¶89
An increasing number of plaintiffs have attempted to use the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) to hold multinational corporations liable for human rights abuses committed
outside the United States. 293 Though no plaintiffs have been successful against
corporations in court, 294 the specter of continuing litigation may cause some suits to settle
out of court. 295 The ATCA grants “[t]he district courts … original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”296 The majority of claims against corporations seek indirect
liability based on the corporation’s link to a third party that committed the abuses. 297
¶90
Jurisdictional Requirements: Courts have interpreted the ATCA to impose certain
jurisdictional requirements that a plaintiff must meet in bringing a suit. One such
requirement, stated directly in the statute, is that the plaintiff be an alien of the US. 298
Another requirement is that the tort complained of be in violation of customary
international law norms, which is the modern term for “the law of nations.”299 Customary
international laws arise from the “general and consistent practice of states [state practice]
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris].”300 They are binding on
287
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all states except for those which have persistently objected to their application. 301
Included within customary international law are jus cogens norms, which are binding on
all states and are non-derogable in all circumstances. 302
Challenges to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs seeking to hold corporations liable under the
ATCA face several challenges. First, they must convince the court that the norms that
the defendant corporation violated are actionable. The Supreme Court addressed the
limitations of actionable norms under the ATCA in its decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain. 303 Though the ATCA is “only jurisdictional,”304 federal courts may recognize
causes of action based on violations of a “narrow class of international norms”305 with at
least the same level of “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations” as those
recognized when Congress first enacted the ATCA in 1789. 306 This decision may
influence courts to curtail their willingness to classify alleged violations as breaches of
the law of nations. 307
Plaintiffs must also determine whether they need to show state action. The
requirement of state action reflects the reality that “[m]ost customary human rights norms
apply only in the context of governmental action.”308 Only some human rights violations,
namely genocide, certain war crimes, piracy, slavery, forced labor, and aircraft hijacking,
are prohibited by the law of nations without state action. 309 To meet the state action
requirement, plaintiffs in ATCA suits against corporations have attempted to show joint
responsibility of the corporation and the state. 310 Many US courts make this state action
determination in a manner similar to that used in domestic civil rights cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that seek to establish private liability under the color of law. 311
Finally, plaintiffs must define the standard of liability. After Sosa, the source of
this standard, whether international or domestic, remains unclear.
International Standard – Aiding and Abetting: One commentator has noted that
while the Sosa Court did not decide the issue of standard of liability, 312 its requirement of
narrowly defining actionable international norms suggests that the standard of liability
should also come from the federal common law, while leaving open the possibility that
this standard may derive from the law of nations. 313 However, the defendant in Sosa was
not a corporation. Since Sosa does not foreclose the idea that corporations are indeed
legitimate defendants in ATCA cases, 314 other ATCA cases involving corporations may
yet provide guidance.
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One of the leading ATCA cases involving a corporation is Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
in which a federal court applied an international criminal aiding and abetting standard to
determine Unocal’s liability for its role in human rights abuses committed by the
Myanmar military, which Unocal knew provided security for its natural gas pipeline
project. 315 The court derived this aiding and abetting standard from international criminal
tribunals, rather than from domestic § 1983 standards to determine private actor
liability. 316 The court announced that a corporation could be held liable for providing
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime.”317 One commentator counsels against applying the aiding and
abetting standard since it is not well-established in federal common law, and would be an
expansive interpretation of the ATCA in the face of Sosa’s requirement of a narrow
one. 318 Post-Sosa courts must decide whether the international aiding and abetting
standard applies in ATCA litigation. 319
¶96
Domestic Standards – Common Law Tort Principles: Courts may, and perhaps
should, apply common law tort principles in determining the standard of liability of
corporations in ATCA suits. 320 Examples of these principles include agency, joint
venture liability, reckless disregard, action in concert, and directing the conduct of
another. 321
b)

Applying ATCA to AngloGold Ashanti
¶97
In this case, Congolese victims of human rights abuses in the Ituri District would
have to initiate the ATCA suit in the US against AngloGold Ashanti. They would also
have to claim that AGA violated an actionable norm of international law. Even limiting
actionable norms to jus cogens violations, 322 plaintiffs pleading forced labor should be
successful on this front, especially since the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Unocal
classified forced labor as a jus cogens violation. 323 Plaintiffs need not show state action
for jus cogens violations. However, for violations not included within jus cogens,
plaintiffs would have to show state action. One test used in domestic cases is the nexus
test, which requires such a connection between the private actor and the state that one
may treat the action of one as the action of the other. 324 In this case, the relationship
between AngloGold Ashanti and the DRC government appears to meet the nexus test
based on the joint venture status of AngloGold Kilo.
315
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However, one problem is that the FNI, not AngloGold Ashanti or the DRC state,
committed the alleged human rights abuses. Plaintiffs can make several arguments to
attempt to overcome this hurdle. First, they can claim that the DRC state and the FNI are
essentially the same, in that the state’s failure to protect citizens against FNI abuses
implicates the state in those abuses. However, AGA may yet escape liability because
joint venture partners are only liable for acts within the scope of the joint venture, 325 and
human rights abuses are outside that scope. Additionally, plaintiffs may claim that AGA
is linked to the FNI based on the specific incidents of interaction between the two
organizations. However, this link is likely too attenuated to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
iii) Torture Victims Protection Act
a)

Current Status
¶99
The Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) provides a cause of action to
US citizens or aliens for acts of torture or extra-judicial killings committed by individuals
“under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”326 Case law
appears to support the notion that corporations as legal individuals are legitimate
defendants in TVPA suits, 327 and the legislative history does not mention an exemption
for corporations from suits. 328 The statute imposes a ten year statute of limitations, 329 and
requires plaintiffs to “exhaust adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”330 Case law suggests that plaintiffs can plead
that exhausting local remedies would be futile or dangerous, and some courts have placed
the burden of proof on the defendant corporation to show that plaintiffs have failed to
exhaust remedies. 331
b)

Applying TVPA to AngloGold Ashanti
¶100
While plaintiffs may be Congolese or American when bringing a suit under the
TVPA against AngloGold Ashanti for torture or extra-judicial killing in the DRC, they
must show state action. Plaintiffs would have to bring the suit by 2014, and they should
have little difficulty showing that exhausting local remedies would be futile or even
dangerous. However, as with the ATCA claim, the plaintiffs face a challenge in proving
state action.
iv) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
a)

325

Current Status
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Plaintiffs have claimed relief in several transnational human rights cases under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. 332 The RICO statute
provides a civil remedy to a person injured by an organization that commits or threatens
racketeering activity, including murder, kidnapping, robbery, and extortion, more than
once and in a way that affects interstate commerce. 333 A defendant found liable under
RICO may have to pay triple damages and the plaintiff’s legal costs. 334 Courts will only
exercise RICO jurisdiction over acts outside the US if the claim passes either an effects
test, in which the acts have substantial effects within the US, or a conduct test, in which
conduct within the US caused damages outside the US.335
b)

Applying RICO to AngloGold Ashanti
¶102
A claim against AGA would fail both the effects test and the conduct test.
Plaintiffs would have difficulty showing that AGA’s acts in the DRC had sufficient
effects in the US, especially since AGA’s activities in the DRC were relegated to
exploration and not commercial production. 336 Plaintiffs would similarly be unable to
show that AGA’s conduct in the US was related to damages in the DRC. 337
¶103

v) Transitory Tort Litigation
US state courts may extend jurisdiction over transitory torts, defined as torts for
which “the tortfeasor’s wrongful acts create an obligation which follows him across
national boundaries.”338 Additionally, US federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
diversity suits between aliens and US citizens, including corporations, if the claim
exceeds $75,000. 339 Pursuing litigation based on a transitory tort theory may be
especially helpful when customary international law will not recognize corporate liability
without state action. 340 Plaintiffs bringing a transitory tort suit against AngloGold
Ashanti face an uphill battle, since AGA is not directly responsible for human rights
abuses in the DRC. Plaintiffs would first have to show that AGA was vicariously liable
for the acts of the FNI, or that AGA acted in concert with the FNI. 341 Then, plaintiffs
would have to show that AGA’s conduct either recklessly caused them harm or
negligently caused them foreseeable harm. 342
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4. Remedies: Precedents for Reparations
¶104

i) Corporate Precedents
Though most cases seeking to hold corporate actors accountable for transnational
human rights abuses have not been successful, several cases suggest precedents for
reparations. In Aguinda v. Texaco, Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens brought an ATCA
claim seeking recovery for damages caused by Texaco’s alleged pollution of rainforests
and rivers in Ecuador and Peru. 343 Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the suit on forum non conveniens grounds since Ecuador
provided an adequate alternative forum, 344 reports about the decision claim that the judge
“promised to oversee enforcement of the Ecuadorian court's ruling.”345 Additionally, as
part of the March 21, 2005, Unocal settlement, Unocal agreed to direct compensation of
victims and the provision of funds to develop programs to improve living conditions,
health care, and education. 346

ii) State Precedents
¶105
The victims of human rights abuses might choose an alternative strategy of
implicating the DRC state for its failure to protect them from such abuses. This approach
might be a substitute for seeking to hold AngloGold Ashanti directly accountable.
¶106
In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), in the Velásquez
Rodríguez Case, in which the complainants sought to hold the state of Honduras
accountable for the disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, declared
that “[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the
appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation.”347 More recently,
the IACHR ordered the state of Guatemala to pay reparations in the form of
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for its responsibility in
connection with the extra- legal execution of Myrna Mack Chang and the subsequent
cover-up of the execution. 348 In a case that may have repercussions for mining companies
seeking to operate in indigenous communities, the IACHR required the state of
Nicaragua to pay reparations for immaterial damages for its role in granting a logging
concession on the land of an indigenous community without the community’s assent. 349
Referenda in Peru and Argentina subsequent to the Nicaragua decision rejected the
proposal of Canadian companies to operate commercial mines based on environmental
343
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concerns. 350 These precedents suggest that Congolese victims of human rights abuses
may be able to obtain reparations from the DRC state if they prove the DRC state failed
to protect them.
¶107
In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights approved The Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law (Basic Principles and Guidelines), which “describe [UN member states’] obligations
in cases of gross violations of international human rights law.”351 The Principles and
Guidelines obligate states to provide victims with “[e]qual and effective access to
justice,” and to make available to the victims “[a]dequate, effective and prompt
reparation.”352
¶108
Plaintiffs should argue that they are entitled to reparations for any judgment against
AGA, based on the precedents in corporate suits. Additionally, if plaintiffs seek to hold
the DRC state accountable for failing to protect them from human rights abuses, they
should rely on the IACHR precedents and the Basic Principles and Guidelines. Plaintiffs
may have to determine how to trace AngloGold Ashanti’s illicit gains for disgorgement,
which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MANNERS OF HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
¶109

This section presents alternative approaches that the international community may
take to ensure corporate actors like AngloGold Ashanti do not become involved in human
rights abuses in conflict areas like the northeast DRC. These approaches require
additional research.
A. UN Security Council Involvement

¶110

The UN Security Council arguably has power to effect change by banning the
mining of gold in conflict zones such as the Ituri District of the DRC since it has “the
authority to intervene, even in internal armed conflicts, to prevent further humanitarian
crises.”353 Such an action would be similar to the Security Council’s call for a ban on the
import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. 354
¶111
Yet this solution, which will effectively mean that corporations from developed
countries could not do business in the conflict zone, has the unintended effect of
eliminating the benevolent, community-building acts that some corporations perform, and
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of allowing less reputable companies which aren’t concerned with human rights to enter
the area.
B. Permanent UN Body to Monitor the Role of Business in Conflict Areas
¶112

The UN Panel of Experts received criticism for its approach to investigating
companies charged with violations of the OECD Guidelines for their operations in the
DRC. 355 However, that panel faced political pressures since it received its mandate from
interested states, and was composed of non-permanent staff members. 356 A more
permanent UN body could fare better at monitoring the role of business in conflict zones.
A permanent body would be able to develop constructive relationships with those
charged with investigating alleged violations of international norms, such as the NCPs
under the OECD Guidelines, and its procedures would be more transparent than those of
an ad hoc panel. 357
C. Adapting the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds

¶113

The Kimberley Process, an initiative supported jointly by governments, the
international diamond industry, and civil society organizations with the aim of stopping
the flow of conflict diamonds, implemented the voluntary Certification Scheme that
requires participants to certify that conflict diamonds are not included in rough diamond
shipments. 358 The initiative includes participants that account for about 99.8% of the
global production of rough diamonds. 359 While the success of the initiative continues to
be a source of debate, 360 Bridgette Radebe, president of the South African Mining
Development Association (SAMDA), has suggested that “t he Kimberley Process to
ensure diamonds are not fuelling conflict in Africa should be replicated to cover the
whole mining sector and broadened to cover other areas like environmental destruction
and corruption.”361 Adapting the Kimberley Process to the gold mining industry could
serve as an important step in ensuring that gold does not come from conflict areas marked
by human rights atrocities.
D. Local Organization

¶114

A “special gold monitoring body” involving all relevant actors, including
representatives of international mining corporations, the DRC state, and civil society
organizations, could monitor compliance with human rights standards, and seek to
provide compensation for victims of human rights abuses related to gold mining. 362
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E. Strict Conditions on Foreign Aid to the DRC

¶115

The international community may impose strict conditions for the disbursement of
aid to the DRC.363 These strict conditions should include provisions that require the DRC
state to regulate corporate activities to ensure corporations do not become involved,
directly or indirectly, in human rights abuses.
F. Guidelines for Operating in Conflict Zones

¶116

In its recently published manual entitled Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice:
Guidance for Extractive Industries, International Alert, an NGO focused on
peacebuilding, provides a set of tools for companies to improve their impact on host
countries and minimize conflict risk. 364 The manual provides background information
about and strategies for addressing a variety of issues companies face in conflict zones,
including dealing with armed groups and human rights. The manual advises companies
to perform due diligence assessments of the local human rights situation, 365 and provides
analysis of the risks and rewards of engaging armed groups. 366 Multinational companies
choosing to operate in conflict zones should at the very least follow these guidelines.
G. Home Government Action

¶117

Home governments can play a more proactive role in policing companies operating
outside of the home country’s borders. Home countries can effectively enforce existing
laws or pass new laws to hold companies accountable for their complicity in human
rights abuses in host countries. Stricter enforcement of home country laws would likely
cause companies to more seriously consider the implications of their decision to operate
in areas where human rights abuses are occurring.
VII.

¶118

CONCLUSION

AngloGold Ashanti is one of the biggest gold- mining companies in the world.
Based on its wealth, it has power to influence human rights on the African continent, and
more specifically, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The company continues to
engage in gold- mining exploration activities in a region that faces instability. 367
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However, no effective international or domestic approach currently exists to hold the
company accountable for that decision, which has indirectly caused the company to be
associated with human rights abuses.
¶119
The international community should address this problem and engage in serious
discussions to develop an approach to ensuring that corporate actors do not become
embroiled in human rights violations. Only then can the northeast DRC, and other
similarly situated areas, turn its natural resource “curse” into a blessing. 368
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